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TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY
INTRODUCTION
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided five important products
liability cases during the survey period.' One case dealt with the preemp-
tion of common law failure-to-warn claims2 and three cases involved or
implied the misuse defense.3 Another breakthrough case addressed the
apparent manufacturer doctrine.! Part I of this survey discusses the Tenth
Circuit's interpretation of the preemption clause of the Medical Device
Amendments of 1976 (MDA) in relation to common law tort claims. Part
II discusses a case of first impression, Yoder v. Honeywell,' and its clari-
fication of the "apparent manufacturer" doctrine's scope. Finally, Part HI
describes the Tenth Circuit's treatment of the misuse defense, and com-
pares this approach to those used by other jurisdictions.
I. PREEMPTION OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY CLAIMS
A. Background
Today, federal agencies regulate hundreds of consumer products
and their proper manufacture, design, and labeling.6 The Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) is one of these agencies, regulating states' actions
in the areas of public health and safety.' The Federal Food and Drug Act,
enacted in 1906, protects the public from adulterated or misbranded
products Congress later expanded the Act to include "adulterated or
misbranded" devices and cosmetics,9 but the legislation did not authorize
control over the introduction of new medical devices.'" With new tech-
nology creating medical equipment such as pacemakers, catheters, artifi-
cial heart valves, and defibrillators," policymakers and the public grew
1. The survey period extended from September I, 1996 through August 31, 1997.
2. See Oja v. Howmedica, Inc., 111 F.3d 782,784(10th Cir. 1997).
3. See Staley v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 106 F.3d 1504, 1508 (10th Cir. 1997); Allen v.
Minnstar, 97 F.3d 1365, 1368-70 (10th Cir. 1996); Daniel v. Ben E. Keith Co., 97 F.3d 1329, 1332
(10th Cir. 1996).
4. See Yoder v. Honeywell Inc., 104 F.3d 1215, 1222-23 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 (1965)).
5. See Yoder, 104 F.3d at 1215, 1223 (failing to find any applicable Colorado case law).
6. See Richard C. Ausness, Federal Preemption of State Products Liability Doctrines, 44
S.C. L. REV. 187, 189-90 (1993).
7. Id.
8. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2245-46 (1996).
9. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA), §§ 501, 502, 52 Stat. 1049-1051
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 351, 352 (1994)); H.R. REP. NO. 94-853, at 6 (1976) (recom-
mending passage of the MDA).
10. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2246.
11. Id.; see also S. REP. No. 94-33, at 5 (1975) (discussing the post-war development of new
medical equipment including pacemakers and artificial heart valves).
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concerned about injuries resulting from the product malfunctions. 2 These
concerns mounted in 1970," when the Dalkon Shield, an intrauterine
contraceptive device," caused thousands of women to suffer from toxic
shock, infertility, pelvic infections, and even death.' Because the FDA
possessed limited authority to prevent these events," Congress enacted
the MDA in 1976,17 requiring the FDA to review medical devices before
they could be marketed to the public.'8
The MDA classified medical devices into three risk-based catego-
ries."9 Class I, relatively risk-free devices such as crutches, are subject to
minimal regulation.' Devices in Class II, such as tampons and oxygen
masks used in anesthesiology,2' are considered riskier, and although they
do not need advance approval by the FDA, manufacturers of these de-
vices must follow federal performance regulations called "special con-
trols." Class III devices either "present a potential unreasonable risk of
illness or injury,"' or are "purported or represented to be for a use in
supporting or sustaining human life"2 ' or for use which "is of substantial
importance in preventing impairment of human health."' Class III de-
vices include such life-saving and potentially life-saving items as pace-
makers' and heart valves. 2
Many Class III devices are subject to a rigorous and lengthy process
known as pre-market approval (PMA),28 which requires the manufacturer
12. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2246.
13. Roger W. Bivans, Note, Substantially Equivalent? Federal Preemption of State Common-
Law Claims Involving Medical Devices, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1087, 1088 (1996).
14. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2246.
15. Id.; see also In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 711-12 (4th Cir. 1989) (discussing the
history of the Dalkon Shield problems and the resulting litigation).
16. See Bivans, supra note 13, at 1088.
17. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2246. The House Report on the MDA states:
Those involved in. the development, promotion, and application of medical devices gen-
erally agree that the public deserves more protection against unsafe, unproven, ineffec-
tive, and experimental medical devices. But this belief is counterbalanced by an equally
strong conviction that excessive or ill-conceived Federal device regulation would stifle
progress in this field.
H.R. REP. No. 94-853, at 10 (1976).
18. See Bivans, supra note 13, at 1088.
19. Id. at 1090.
20. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(l)(A)(I)-(II) (1994); Ginochio v. Surgikos, Inc., 864 F. Supp.
948, 950 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (describing the various classifications and providing examples of Class I
devices).
21. See Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 37, 42 (D. Mass. 1994) (describing the classi-
fications of medical devices and providing examples of Class II devices).
22. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B); see also Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2246 (discussing Class II
devices and the requirement that manufacturers of such devices comply with "special controls").
23. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(l)(C)(ii)(II).
24. Id. § (a)(l)(C)(ii)(I).
25. Id.
26. See Larsen v. Pacesetter Sys., Inc., 837 P.2d 1273, 1282 (Haw. 1992).
27. Ministry of Health v. Shiley, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 1426, 1431 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
28. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2246-47.
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to submit a pre-market application with all relevant information substan-
tiating the product's safety and effectiveness.' Such info *rmation includes
reports of investigations of safety and effectiveness, statements of com-
ponents and principles of operation of the device, and proposed
labeling."0 After the information is submitted, the FDA will not grant
approval until both FDA officials and an outside panel of experts review
and approve the PMA application.3'
Class III devices, however, may escape the rigorous qualifications
imposed by the PMA requirement."2 Section 360(k) of the MDA imposes
a limited form of review for manufacturers seeking to market new de-
vices similar to those already available on the market. This is known as
the "510(k) process."" A device can be marketed without further regula-
tory analysis if the FDA determines that the device is "substantially
equivalent" to a pre-existing device." The MDA, however, gives little
guidance in defining "substantially equivalent." The broad guidelines
set forth in the MDA require the manufacturer to submit information
proving "substantial equivalence," and allow the FDA to request addi-
tional information before approval." FDA 510(k) approval is not an en-
29. See Jeffrey N. Gibbs & Bruce F. Mackler, Food and Drug Administration Regulation and
Products Liability: Strong Sword, Weak Shield, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 194, 208-09 (1987).
30. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c(a)(3)(A), (D)(i).
31. See id. §360c(b)(l)(B).
32. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2247 (noting that most Class III devices have not received
premarket approval due to two important exceptions to the PMA requirement).
33. Id.
34. Id. The Medtronic Court noted that the 510(k) process eventually became the means by
which most new medical devices were approved. The Court referred to a House Report stating that
1,000 of approximately 1,100 Class III devices were considered to be "substantially equivalent" to
pre-existing devices, and therefore, not subject to the rigorous PMA process. Id. at 2247-48. (citing
STAFF SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND
COMMERCE, MEDICAL DEVICE REGULATION: THE FDA'S NEGLECTED CHILD 34 (Comm. Print
1983). The Court also noted that in 1990, 80% of new Class Ill devices entered the market through
the section 510(k) process. Id. at 2248 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 101-808, at 14 (1990)).
35. Id. at 2247.
36. See Jonathan S. Kahan, Premarket Approval v. Premarket Notification: Different Routes to
the Same Market, 39 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 510, 519-20 (1984). Scholars have also argued that the
term "substantially equivalent" is unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Kaplan, Through
the Maze of 5O(k)s, 39 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 160, 163 (1984).
37. See 21 C.F.R. § 807.87(0 (1987). The legislative history regarding the definition of "sub-
stantially equivalent" states the following:
[Tihe term substantially equivalent is not intended to be so narrow as to refer only to de-
vices that are identical to marketed devices nor so broad as to refer to devices which are
intended to be used for the same purpose as the marketed products. The Committee be-
lieves the term should be construed narrowly where necessary to assure the safety and ef-
fectiveness of a device but not so narrowly where differences between a new device and a
marketed device do not relate to safety and effectiveness. Thus, differences between
"new" and marketed devices in material, design, or energy sources, for example would
have a bearing on the adequacy of information as to a new device's safety and effective-
ness, and such devices should be automatically classified in Class In1. On the other hand,
copies of devices marketed prior to enactment or devices whose variations are immaterial
to safety and effectiveness would not necessarily fall under the automatic classification
scheme.
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dorsement of the device's safety,38 but the process is significantly faster
and less financially burdensome on manufacturers than the PMA
process, 9 and as a result most manufacturers prefer to file a 5 10(k) appli-
cation instead of a PMA.'
Section 360k(a) expressly forbids states from establishing any re-
quirements that are "different from or in addition to" any FDA safety or
effectiveness standard applicable to a medical device regulated by the
MDA." Thus, this amendment clearly preempts state regulations and
statutes,"2 but it remains unclear whether 360k(a) also preempts state tort
law.'3 Under state common law, products liability laws were designed to
remedy injured consumers," prompting manufacturers to design and dis-
tribute safer products and thus avoid lawsuits and large damage awards.'
The MDA, however, does not provide compensation for injured consum-
ers," and encourages manufacturers to develop and utilize new technolo-
gies and ensure minimum safety testing." This overlap between the
H.R. REP. No. 94-853, at 36-37 (1976).
38. See, e.g., Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2248 (noting that a 510(k) determination allowing the
marketing of a pacemaker did not in any way endorse that pacemaker's safety).
39. Robert J. Katerberg, Note, Patching the "Crazy Quilt" of Cippolone: A Divided Court
Rethinks Federal Preemption of Products Liability in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1440,
1461 (1997). The PMA process requires the FDA to review information submitted by manufacturers
for an average of 1,200 hours while the 510(k) process takes about 20 hours. See Martin v. Telec-
tronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 105 F.3d 1090, 1095 (10th Cir. 1997). In addition, the cost to manufactur-
ers was between $111,000 and $828,000 of the PMA process while the cost to manufacturers to
undergo the 5 10(k) process was between $50 and $2,000. See Robert B. Leflar, Public Accountabil-
ity and Medical Device Regulation, 2 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 47 (1989).
40. See Kahan, supra note 36, at 519.
41. Section 360k(a) states, in relevant part:
(a) General rule
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State or political subdivision of a
State may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human use
any requirement-
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this
chapter to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter in-
cluded in a requirement applicable to the device under this chapter.
21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994).
42. See Ausness, supra note 6, at 281.
43. See id. See generally Allison Weiser, Stone Offers Advice on Preemption Cases to Confer-
ence Attendees, Andrews Med. Devices Litig. Rep. 9 (July 1, 1997) (discussing how courts are
confused over the breadth of the preemption provisions in product liability litigation).
44. See Katerberg, supra note 39, at 1440.
45. See id.; see, e.g., Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring) ("It is to the public interest to discourage the marketing of products having
defects that are a menace to the public."); Mary L. Lyndon, Tort Law and Technology, 12 YALE J.
ON REG. 137, 176 (1995) ("[T]ort law's signals [to manufacturers] contain necessary basic messages
that are not delivered through any other medium. An important function of the law is to guide early
evolution of technologies .... ).
46. See Katerberg, supra note 39, at 1441.
47. See id.
MDA's purpose and states' interests has confused courts trying to deter-
mine the preemptive scope of the MDA."
Legislative history does not reveal congressional intent regarding
MDA preemption of common law tort claims. ' The Supremacy Clause
provides that federal law takes precedence over contradictory state law,"
and preemption has traditionally involved federal regulations that super-
sede conflicting state and local administrative regulations, statutes, or
ordinances." Federal regulations rarely preempt state common law unless
a congressional intent to preempt is "clear and manifest." 2 The FDA,
however, has interpreted the MDA to preempt state regulations, statutes,
and the common law. The idea that federal regulations should displace
state common tort law has caused controversy and confusion.' Courts
disagree about the precise scope of 360(k)a," and the Supreme Court
attempted to settle this matter in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr.'
In Medtronic, the Supreme Court analyzed and interpreted the
MDA.' Medtronic, Inc., a medical device manufacturer, introduced the
Model 4011 pacemaker into the market,' and the plaintiff was implanted
with the device.' The pacemaker basically mirrored the designs of ex-
isting models,'m and the FDA found the pacemaker to be "substantially
equivalent to devices introduced into interstate commerce prior to the
effective date of the [MDA]. '"' As a result, the new pacemaker did not
undergo the extensive review process required for new designs.' The
pacemaker failed, resulting in a "complete heart block," and emergency
surgery for the plaintiff.63
48. See id. at 1442.
49. See Ausness, supra note 6, at 282; Katerberg, supra note 39, at 1462-63.
50. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, cl. 2.
51. See Ausness, supra note 6, at 189. See generally Michael Maher, Federal Preemption,
New Barrier to Injured Victims, TRIAL, Nov. 1991, at 61 (1991) (discussing federal preemption in
the context of several areas of tort litigation).
52. Ausness, supra note 6, at 192 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947)). Courts are hesitant to allow preemption within a particular area traditionally reserved to the
states. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461
U.S. 190, 206 (1983).
53. See Ausness, supra note 6, at 283. In addition, the FDCA contains no preemption provi-
sion while section 360k(a) expressly preempts state requirements. Id.
54. See Maher, supra note 5 1, at 61.
55. See Weiser, supra note 43 (discussing courts' various interpretations of section 360(k)a).
56. 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996).
57. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2240.
58. Id. at 2248.
59. The failure of the pacemaker was attributed to a defective lead, the component that trans-
mits the heartbeat-steadying electrical signal from the "pulse generator" to the heart. Id.
60. See id.; Katerberg, supra note 39, at 1448.
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The plaintiff filed a complaint against Medtronic based upon state
common law negligence and strict liability.' Medtronic argued that sec-
tion 360(k)(a) preempted both claims.' The Eleventh Circuit held that
although the negligent design claims were not preempted, the negligent
manufacture and failure-to-warn claims were preempted, ' and the court
limited the strict liability claim to the theory that the pacemaker was "un-
reasonably dangerous." 7
In a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh
Circuit's finding of no preemption of design claims,' but reversed re-
garding the negligent manufacturer and failure-to-warn claims." In de-
termining the preemptive scope of the MDA, the Court applied a two-
pronged inquiry. First, the Court noted that federal requirements must be
specific to a particular device.' ° The Court found that the plaintiffs state
common law claims were developed "specifically in regard to medical
devices," while the federal labeling and manufacturing requirements
essentially reflected generic and general concerns about device regula-
tion.7
In addition, the Court held that any state regulation of medical de-
vices must be "different from or in addition to" a federal requirement in
order to be preempted.72 The state requirements were not specifically
developed with respect to medical devices" because they were not the
"kinds of requirements that Congress and the FDA feared would impede
the ability of federal regulators to implement and enforce specific federal
requirements."' Both the failure-to-warn and negligent manufacturing
claims involved general duties of the manufacturer to use due care or to
inform users of potentially dangerous items.'5 The Court held that federal
law did not preempt these general obligations."
Despite the Supreme Court's discussion, the decision left some
gaps." First, Medtronic departed from an earlier Supreme Court decision
in which, under a similar federal statute, the Court found state claims
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335, 1347-51 (11 th Cir. 1995) (holding that while
the negligent design claim was not preempted by the MDA, the negligent manufacture claim and
failure-to-warn claims were preempted).
67. Lohr, 56 F.3d at 1347-49. The court also refused to let the plaintiffs change their pre-
empted negligence claims into a strict liability claim. Id. at 1352.
68. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2255.
69. Id. at 2258.







77. See Weiser, supra note 43 (discussing the "badly fractured decision" in Medtronic).
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were preempted by federal law."8 Furthermore, the internal division of the
Medtronic Court failed to resolve some issues.' The Tenth Circuit at-
tempted to clarify this issue during the survey period.
B. Oja v. Howmedica, Inc.'
1. Facts
The plaintiff replaced her artificial hip with a Porous-Coated Anat-
omic One-Piece Acetabular Component hip (PCA hip)" produced by
Howmedica. Eight years later she experienced severe pain in her hip and
underwent surgery, which revealed that "the staking peg was missing,
that the polyethylene liner had completely disengaged from the metal
cup, and that debris had spread into Oja's hip joint."'' This caused severe
bone dissolution and significant defects in Oja's hip.'
The plaintiff filed a products liability suit against Howmedica, as-
serting claims of negligence, negligent failure-to-warn, and strict liabil-
ity. ' Howmedica, however, argued that these claims were preempted
under the MDA.' The district court returned a general verdict for How-
medica on the negligence and strict liability claims," but it also found
that the MDA did not preempt Oja's negligent failure-to-warn claim, and
therefore, entitled Oja to relief."
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit applied the Medtronic two-pronged test to deter-
mine the preemptive scope of the MDA." First, although the plaintiff's
case involved a specific federal requirement applicable to the PCA hip,
the failure-to-warn claim was not "specifically developed 'with respect
to' medical devices."" The claim was predicated upon a general common
law duty applicable to every manufacturer "to inform users and purchas-
ers of potentially dangerous items of the risks involved in their use."'
Second, the court held that federal law did not preempt the failure-to-
78. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521-23 (1992).
79. See generally Katerberg, supra note 39 (analyzing the plurality decision in Medironic and
its ramifications on products liability claims).
80. 111 F.3d 782, 785 (10th Cir. 1997).
81. Oja, Ill F.3d at 785.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 784.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 785.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 788.
89. Id. at 789 (quoting Medironic, 116 S. Ct. at 2258).
90. Id.
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warn claim because it did not involve the type of device-specific re-
quirements that would threaten the MDA's federal interests."'
C. Other Circuits
Two other circuits addressed this issue during the survey period. In
Martin v. Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc., the Sixth Circuit applied
Medtronic's two-prong test. The court determined that the state re-
quirements specifically applied to investigational devices, unlike the
general statutory concerns involved in Medtronic.' In addition, the court
found that the state requirements were different from those mandated
under the federal scheme and would "impede the implementation and
enforcement of specific federal requirements. '" The court also deter-
mined that allowing a cause of action in a case in which the FDA specifi-
cally approved the design of a device for investigational purposes would
thwart the goals of safety and innovation."
The Fourth Circuit addressed the issue as well, holding that the
MDA did not preempt common law tort claims by the recipient of a de-
fective penile prosthesis.' In Martin v. American Medical Systems
(AMS), the plaintiff suffered from erectile dysfunction,' and was surgi-
cally implanted with AMS's Dyaflex, an inflatable penile prosthesis." He
subsequently developed a severe infection, and was forced to undergo
numerous surgical procedures that shortened and disfigured his penis."
He then filed several tort and warranty theory claims against AMS.'"
AMS moved for summary judgment, arguing that the MDA preempted
Martin's claim."' The district court held that all claims were preempted
except the breach of express warranty claim.'" The Fourth Circuit over-
turned, holding that because the Dyaflex received 510(k) approval, fed-
eral law did not preempt state common law tort claims." The court dis-
cussed Medtronic and noted that the 510(k) process could not be consid-
91. Id.
92. 105 F.3d 1090 (6th Cir. 1997).
93. Telectronics, 105 F.3d at 1098-1101 (discussing the "investigational devices" exemption
in terms of Martin's claims).
94. Id. at 1099 (citing Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2258).
95. Id. at 1098-99.
96. Martin v. American Med. Sys., Inc., 116 F.3d 102, 104 (4th Cir. 1997).





102. Id. On the breach of express warranty claim, the court held that the plaintiff could not
show reliance on the express "Limited Warranty" made to his urologist by American Medical. Id.
103. Id. at 104.
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ered as FDA approval because it only existed to preserve the pre-1976
status quo,'" which included potential state law liability."
D. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's application of Medtronic preserved state com-
mon law doctrine. Prior to Medtronic, manufacturers faced little deter-
rence from producing dangerous consumer products." Although the
MDA's purpose was to increase product safety and prevent consumer
injuries,'"m the 510(k) exception contradicted this goal.' With the excep-
tion intact, consumers could purchase unsafe devices that were merely
"substantially equivalent" to devices already on the market." Indeed, if
pre-existing devices on the market were ineffective, unsafe, or even
deadly, manufacturers were essentially encouraged to continue produc-
tion in order to satisfy the 510(k) "substantially equivalent" definition." °
Because of the MDA's vague guidelines,"' almost all manufacturers sat-
isfied this test."2 Even when one of these devices injured a consumer, the
manufacturer could escape common law product liability claims by rais-
ing the MDA's preemption clause, thereby avoiding litigation on the
merits of the claim."3
In an effort to guide lower courts in applying preemption laws,
Medtronic expanded consumer protection. After Medtronic, the general
consensus among circuits is that any state claim that is "different from or
in addition to" the federal requirements will be preempted."" What ex-
actly constitutes "different" has not been specifically defined by either
the Supreme Court or the Tenth Circuit, and MDA preemption issues
remain very fact-specific. Although the Medtronic test may give lower
courts additional flexibility in many situations, ' 5 the test is vague enough
to make liability difficult for manufacturers to predict. Manufacturers
may take advantage of this ambiguity and attempt to use it as technical
subterfuge to escape liability. As a result, consumers may encounter
great difficulty in relying on state common law for their claims.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See Robert B. Leflar & Robert S. Adler, The Preemption Pentad: Federal Preemption of
Products Liability Claims After Medtronic, 64 TENN. L. REV. 691, 694-715 (1997) (discussing the
state of Pre-Medtronic products liability preemption, the Medtronic decision, and the aftermath).
107. See Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified as
amended at Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 § 4(a), 21 U.S.C. §§ 360-360k (1994)).
108. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
109. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116S. Ct. 2240, 2248 (1996).
110. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
Ill. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
113. See Kahan, supra note 36, at 519; supra note 41 and accompanying text.
114. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2248 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994)).
115. See Medtronic, i16 S. Ct. at 2257.
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II. THE APPARENT MANUFACTURER DOCTRINE'S FIRST IMPRESSION:
YODER V. HONEYWELL6
A. Background
The apparent manufacturer doctrine makes non-manufacturing sell-
ers liable for their involvement with defective products."' Defined in the
Second Restatement of Torts, "8 this doctrine subjects a nonmanufacturer
of a product to the same liability as a manufacturer.' 9 As a result, retail-
ers, distributors and trademark licensors"' face potential liability."' Most
apparent manufacturer cases involve "a defendant labeling or affixing to
the product its own name, trade name, or trademark, or an advertisement
identifying the defendant as the maker of the product.""'
Consumer expectations dictate the need for this approach;' a con-
sumer may reasonably believe that the nonmanufacturer created the
product and may rely upon their reputation and skill when choosing the
product.'" Therefore, if a company induces the public to believe that it
manufactured the product, the apparent manufacturer doctrine will im-
pose liability upon that company."' The apparent manufacturer doctrine
also helps to define appropriate accountability and to deter the misuse of
corporate structures to evade tort liability."
116. 104 F.3d 1215(1997).
117. See Seasword v. Hilti, Inc., 537 N.W.2d 221, 223 (Mich. 1995).
118. Section 400 provides: "One who puts out as his own product a chattel manufactured by
another is subject to the same liability as though he were its manufacturer." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 (1965).
119. Seasword, 537 N.W.2d at 223. In principle, the apparent manufacturer doctrine expands
tort liability and guarantees "that some entity in the product enterprise remains answerable for inju-
ries caused by defective products." See Rosemary G. Schikora, No "Apparent Manufacturer" Li-
ability in Michigan, MICH. BAR J., Mar. 1996, at 247 (quoting Seasword, 537 N.W.2d at 223).
120. Most courts that impose liability on trademark licensors only do so if the licensor also
played a significant role in the chain of distribution. See Burkert v. Petrol Plus, 579 A.2d 26. 33-34
(Conn. 1990).
121. See, e.g., Dudley Sports Co. v. Schmitt, 279 N.E.2d 266, 273-74 (Ind. CL App. 1972)
(using the apparent manufacturer doctrine to impose liability on a distributor); see also Kasel v.
Remington Arms Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 711, 717-19 (Ct. App. 1972) (imposing liability on trademark
licensor who played a significant role in forming the entity that manufactured the product); Rubbo v.
Hughes Provision Co., 34 N.E.2d 202, 204 (Ohio 1941) (estopping defendant, who was trademark
licensor and retailer of the product, from denying agency, therefore imposing liability on the defen-
dant).
122. Seasword v. Hilti, Inc., 525 N.W.2d 501, 502 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
123. See Schikora, supra note 119, at 247.
124. Root v. J.H. Indus., Inc., 660 N.E.2d 195, 198 (Il. App. Ct. 1995) (quoting Hebel v.
Sherman Equip., 442 N.E.2d 199, 203 (Il. 1982)).
125. See Alan J. Lazarus et al., Recent Developments in Products, General Liability, and Con-
sumer Law, 32 TORT & INS. L. 499,499(1997).
126. See Seasword v. Hilti, Inc., 537 N.W.2d 221, 224 (Mich. 1995).
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At least eighteen states have recognized the apparent manufacturer
doctrine,'2" which was incorporated into the Model Uniform Product Li-
ability Act.'" Most jurisdictions that recognize this doctrine have also
adopted strict tort liability as a theory of recovery.'" Jurisdictions refus-
ing to recognize strict liability often choose not to adopt the apparent
manufacturer doctrine because, when combined with other theories, it
often ultimately imposes strict liability upon nonmanufacturers' °
Some courts, however, have found that the use of the apparent
manufacturer doctrine is unnecessary because current theories of seller
liability and related tort doctrines generate the same result.' For exam-
ple, a seller can be found liable under the laws of agency, fraud, and mis-
representation in a situation where the seller uses a product label upon
which consumers rely.' "Piercing the corporate veil" and successor li-
ability may also be used by courts to establish liability,'3 thus holding
corporate stockholders personally liable for defective product injuries,
even though the stockholder did not manufacture the product.'" Simi-
larly, successor liability may hold a corporation that merges with, or ac-
quires, another corporation liable for injuries caused by a defective prod-
uct produced by the old corporation.'
These theories are limited, however. For example, "piercing the cor-
porate veil" is appropriate only when public policy is violated or a corpo-
rate structure is misused to escape justice.'" Similarly, successor liability
is often available only in limited circumstances.' The precise application
127. Jan C. Leventer, Annual Survey of Michigan Law, Torts, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 1181, 1207
(1997); see Seasword, 537 N.W.2d at 223 n.8 (listing courts which have adopted the apparent manu-
facturer doctrine).
128. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979).
129. See, e.g., Davis v. United States Gauge, 844 F. Supp. 1443 (D. Kan. 1994); Rice v. Arm-
strong World Indus., Inc., 653 F. Supp. 763 (D. Colo. 1987); Burkert v. Petro Plus, 579 A.2d 26
(Conn. 1990); Pierce v. Liberty Furniture Co., 233 S.E.2d 33 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977); Coca Cola Bot-
tling Co., Inc. v. Reeves, 486 So. 2d 374 (Miss. 1986); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Black, 708 S.W.2d
925 (Tex. App. 1986); Zamora v. Mobil Corp., 704 P.2d 584 (Wash. 1985).
130. Seasword v. Hilti, Inc., 525 N.W.2d 501, 504 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) ("Regardless of
whether the seller holds the product out as its own, the seller has no input in the design of the prod-
uct. Thus, imposing liability would amount to strict liability, which this jurisdiction has declined to
adopt.").
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., Dudley Sports Co. v. Schmitt, 279 N.E.2d 266 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972); Fahey v.
Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc., 482 N.E.2d 519 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985); Commissioners of State Ins.
Fund v. City Chem. Corp., 48 N.E.2d 262 (N.Y. 1943).
133. See Seasword, 537 N.W.2d at 224-25.
134. See Messick v. Moring, 514 So. 2d 892, 894 (Ala. 1987) (listing commonly used justifica-
tions for "piercing the corporate veil" and imposing liability on shareholders or a controlling corpo-
ration).
135. See Rawlings v. D.M. Oliver, Inc., 159 Cal. Rptr. 119, 120 (Ct. App. 1979).
136. See Leventer, supra note 127, at 1207.
137. See, e.g., Parson v. Roper Whitnesy, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1447 (W.D. Wis. 1984) (granting
successor corporation summary judgment in a products liability action by a worker who suffered
injuries while operating a hydraulic press brake); In re Related Asbestos Cases, 578 F. Supp. 91
(N.D. Cal. 1983) (allowing successor corporation to escape liability for worker's asbestos-related
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of this apparent manufacturer doctrine continues to develop, and many
jurisdictions remain undecided about the scope and use of the doctrine.38
B. Yoder v. Honeywell"9
1. Facts
The plaintiff, in the course of her employment, used a defective
computer keyboard and consequently suffered from repetitive stress inju-
ries, including bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, bilateral radial tunnel
syndrome and bilateral thoracic outlet syndrome." She brought suit
against the manufacturer of the office keyboards, Bull HN Information
Systems, Inc., and against Bull's parent corporation, Honeywell."' One
of her claims alleged that Honeywell, even though a subsidiary and not
the actual keyboard manufacturer, should be held liable under the appar-
ent manufacturer doctrine.' 2 She premised this claim upon Section 400 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts' 3 and Colorado law." Although Hon-
eywell's trademark was on four of the seven keyboards used by the
plaintiff, the district court held that Honeywell was not liable to the
plaintiff as a manufacturer and declined to apply the apparent manufac-
turer doctrine."
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit recognized that Colorado law did not address
whether the apparent manufacturer doctrine would apply under state
law." The court examined the Colorado Products Liability Act and the
Colorado Revised Statutes section 13-21-401, which imposes strict li-
ability for defective products on "manufacturers."" In analyzing the
injuries); Matrix-Churchill v. Springsteen, 461 So. 2d 782 (Ala. 1984) (holding that successor corpo-
ration could not be liable for a worker's injuries sustained from a metal brake); Burr v. South Bend
Lathe, Inc., 480 N.E.2d 105 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (allowing no liability to successor in a strict
liability action where there were a series of successors).
138. See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
139. 104F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 1997).
140. Yoder, 104 F.3d at 1215.
141. Seeid. at 1218.
142. Id. at 1219.
143. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 (1965).
144. Yoder, 104 F.3d at 1222-23.
145. Id. at 1219.
146. Id. at 1223.
147. Id. Section 13-21-401 defines a manufacturer as:
[A] person or entity who designs, assembles, fabricates, produces, constructs, or other-
wise prepares a product or a component part of a product prior to the sale of the product
to a user or consumer. The term includes any seller who has actual knowledge of a defect
in a product or a seller of a product who creates and furnishes a manufacturer with speci-
fications relevant to the alleged defect for producing the product or who otherwise exer-
cises some significant control over all or a portion of the manufacturing process or who
alters or modifies a product in any significant manner after the product comes into his
possession and before it is sold to the ultimate user or consumer. The term also includes
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definition of "manufacturer" in the statute, the court determined that
Colorado, by negative implication, had adopted the "essence" of the Re-
statement. '"
Nonetheless, the court refused to extend liability to Honeywell un-
der the apparent manufacturer doctrine 9 because Honeywell did not sell
or distribute the keyboards, and because many courts have declined to
extend section 400 of the Restatement beyond sellers or distributors of
defective products.5" The court rejected the plaintiffs argument that the
Restatement allows courts to extend strict liability to owners of trade-
marks who are not otherwise involved in the "chain of distribution."''
The court also disregarded the argument that Colorado Revised Statute
section 13-21-401 defines "manufacturer" as someone who "otherwise
prepares a product" before its sale;'5" rather, the court limited the applica-
tion of the apparent manufacturer doctrine to trademark owners." In
addition, the court noted that the plain meaning of the phrase "otherwise
prepares a product" did not include those whose names were merely
placed upon the product.'5 '
C. Analysis
Because courts have experienced difficulty in determining the pre-
cise scope and application of the apparent manufacturer doctrine, Yoder
undoubtedly clarified the apparent manufacturer doctrine's scope.'5 In
imposing liability on a company whose name appears on a product, most
courts seek to protect consumer expectations.'" Despite the fact that
Honeywell's name appeared on four of the seven keyboards, which
any seller of a product who is owned in whole or significant part by the manufacturer or
who owns, in whole or significant part, the manufacturer. A seller not otherwise a manu-
facturer shall not be deemed to be a manufacturer merely because he places or has placed
a private label on a product if he did not otherwise specify how the product shall be pro-
duced or control, in some significant manner, the manufacturing process of the product
and the seller discloses who the actual manufacturer is.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-401 (1997).
148. The court noted that the last sentence of the statutory definition was similar to section 400
of the Restatement and therefore, "[b]y negative implication the statute allows a seller who places a
private label on a product without disclosing the actual manufacturer to be liable as a manufacturer."
Yoder, 104 F.3d at 1223.
149. Id. at 1224.
150. Id. The court recognized several jurisdictions following this principle. See, e.g., Fletcher v.
Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451, 1463 (2d Cir. 1995) (upholding summary judgment on apparent manufac-
turer claims where defendant was neither seller of computer keyboard nor otherwise involved in the
chain of distribution); Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. Trane Co., 831 F.2d 153, 155-56 (7th Cir. 1987)
(rejecting liability for product designer who did not sell, manufacture or install gas heater); Nelson v.
International Paint Co., Inc., 734 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1984) (declining to impose liability on parent
company uninvolved in distribution).
151. Yoder, 104 F.3d at 1223-24.
152. Id. at 1224.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
156. See Leventer, supra note 127, at 1207-08.
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would give rise to the plaintiff's expectations that the keyboards were in
fact manufactured by Honeywell, the court ignored the trend"' and held
that Honeywell was not liable."
The purpose of imposing liability under tort principles is to induce
"socially desirable conduct."'' 9 Because nonmanufacturers are often un-
aware of the dangers created by the manufacturer, nonmanufacturer li-
ability would not further deterrence principles and could be "grossly un-
fair. '' "w By limiting the apparent manufacturer doctrine to only manufac-
turers, Yoder deters manufacturers of products and those extremely fa-
miliar with them from producing or distributing items that do not meet
the highest possible standards.'6' Additionally, consumers retain the abil-
ity to seek compensation from those manufacturers.
In contrast, some commentators argue that Yoder may damage con-
sumer interests.' Plaintiffs may face a larger burden of finding and
identifying the correct product manufacturer, " 3 may be forced to exercise
due diligence in attempting to identify the actual manufacturer, and will
be unable to rely upon labels or names placed upon the product.'" As a
result, consumers may have to file numerous claims against a variety of
defendants in order to identify the actual manufacturer.' This burden on
consumers, however, is necessary to uphold principles of fairness. While
consumers may have to investigate a product more thoroughly before
relying upon its label, such an investigation is necessary to maintain an
adequate balance between protecting nonmanufacturers from infinite
liability and insuring adequate consumer protection.
157. See, e.g., Torres v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 786 P.2d 939, 947 (Ariz. 1990) (sug-
gesting liability for a trademark licensor that had the ability to control the merchandise); Hartford v.
Associated Construction Co., 384 A.2d 390 (Conn. 1978) (holding that the apparent manufacturer
doctrine applies even to trademark licensors not involved in the production, marketing or distribution
of the defective product). But see Nelson v. International Paint Co., 734 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1984)
(holding that trademark name alone on product is not enough to justify liability under the apparent
manufacturer doctrine).
158. Yoder, 104 F.3d at 1223.
159. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability:
The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 273 (1990).
160. Id. at 274.
161. See Kevin P. Kavanagh & Peter H. Webster, Annual Survey of Michigan Law, Torts, 42
WAYNE L. REV. 1191,1218 (1996).
162. See Schikora, supra note 119, at 247; Ellen Wertheimer, Unknowable Dangers and the
Death of Strict Products Liability: The Empire Strikes Back, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 1183, 1189 (1992).
163. See Kavanagh & Webster, supra note 161, at 1218.
164. See Schikora, supra note 119, at 247.




Misuse is one of the most common defenses to product liability ac-
tions,". asserting that the plaintiffs conduct was so unforeseeable and
improper that the plaintiff, not a product defect, caused the injury.67 This
defense is also used to either disprove causation, or to demonstrate that a
product defect never existed." Limiting the manufacturer's or supplier's
liability ensures that products liability law does not serve as a substitute
insurance policy for consumers."w
Courts disagree upon the meaning of misuse and have developed a
variety of definitions for the doctrine, "' resulting in numerous defini-
tional disagreements.' Misuse has been defined by some courts as "a use
or handling so unusual that the average consumer could not reasonably
expect the product to be designed and manufactured to withstand it-a
use that the seller, therefore, need not anticipate and provide for."'" Other
courts have defined misuse as "use of a product where it is handled in a
way which the manufacturer could not have reasonably foreseen or ex-
pected in the normal and intended use of the product and the plaintiff
could foresee an injury as the result of the unintended use,""' or "use of
the product which constitutes willful or reckless misconduct or an invita-
tion of injury.""'
Some courts define misuse simply as "a use of the product in a
manner which defendant could not reasonably foresee,"'7 5 or "a use not
reasonably foreseeable."'7 6 Many courts refer to the Restatement of (Sec-
ond) of Torts section 402A as a basis for implementing this defense.'"
166. Christopher H. Toll, The Burden of Proving Misuse in Products Liability Cases, 20 COLO.
LAW. 2307, 2307 (1991).
167. Peter Zablotsky, Appropriate Role of Plaintiff Misuse in Products Liability Causes of
Action, 10 TOURO L. REV. 183, 191-92 (1993).
168. See, e.g., Gangi v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 360 A.2d 907 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1976); Calvert
Fire Ins. Co. v. Fyr-Fyter Sales & Serv., 425 N.E.2d 910 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979).
169. Harville v. Anchor-Wate Co., 663 F.2d 598, 602 (5th Cir. 1981).
170. See Zablotsky, supra note 167, at 190-91; see also Simpson v. Standard Container Co.,
527 A.2d 1337, 1340 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987) (discussing multiple definitions of "misuse").
17 1. See Simpson, 527 A.2d at 1341 (quoting Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 495 A.2d 348,
354-55 (Md. 1985)).
172. Ellsworth, 495 A.2d at 355.
173. id. at 354-55.
174. Id. at 355.
175. Id. at 354.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 353 (stating that "[m]ost jurisdictions have adopted the Restatement view that mis-
use is a factor in strict liability actions"). Comment h to section 402A of the Restatement states:
A product is not in a defective condition when it is safe for normal handling and con-
sumption. If the injury results from abnormal handling, as where a bottled beverage is
knocked against a radiator to remove the cap, or from abnormal preparation for use, as
where too much salt is added to food, or from abnormal consumption, as where a child
eats too much candy and is made ill, the seller is not liable.
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Misuse evolved within the doctrine of strict liability embodied in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A.'" Section 402A recognizes
misuse as "a defense for the manufacturer where the user mishandles or
misuses a product and thereby causes a dangerous condition."'" Under
this doctrine, the defendant must prove that the use occurred in an unin-
tended manner or for an unintended purpose, that the use must not have
been reasonably foreseeable by the manufacturer, and that the misuse
caused the injury."0
This defense is similar to comparative fault or assumption of risk,
which also involve an examination of the plaintiffs conduct.'8 ' Assump-
tion of risk, a strict liability defense used when the plaintiff has "volun-
tarily and unreasonably proceed[ed] to encounter a known danger,"'"0
focuses upon the plaintiff's culpability.'" The plaintiff may not recover if
he or she "voluntarily proceeds in the face of known danger.' Com-
parative fault is, essentially, the application of comparative negligence
principles to other tort theories, such as strict liability." Some courts
have refused to apply this doctrine beyond negligence actions."
Other courts, however, have used comparative fault principles to
apportion the fault of each party, regardless of the theory of liability un-
der which the plaintiff proceeds.'87 In other words, the manufacturer may
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. h (1965).
178. Section 402A provides:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused
to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the
condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the us er or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual
relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
179. Id.
180. See Zablotsky, supra note 167, at 191-93.
181. Toll, supra note 166, at 2307.
182. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. n.
183. Hughes v. Magic Chef, Inc., 288 N.W.2d 542,545 (Iowa 1980).
184. Id.; see also Toll, supra note 166, at 2307 (defining assumption of the risk as "voluntarily
and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger").
185. Id.
186. See, e.g., Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795, 802 (8th Cir. 1976) (observing that
applying a comparative negligence statute in a strict liability case would be "extremely confusing
and inappropriate"); Kinard v. Coats Co., 553 P.2d 835, 837 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976) (refusing to
extend the application of comparative negligence principles to products liability actions under Re-
statement (Second) of Torts section 402A because such actions are not based upon negligence prin-
ciples).
187. See Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Cal. 1978) (extending compara-
tive negligence principles to strict liability actions and recognizing the broad applicability of "fault"
in both negligence and strict liability cases).
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be relieved of liability in proportion to the user's misuse of the product.'"
Most jurisdictions, however, apply misuse as a complete bar to
recovery.'" The difficulty with applying comparative fault principles in
strict liability arises because comparative fault neutralizes the impact and
underlying purpose of a strict liability claim.'" In some jurisdictions,
comparative fault may allow some recovery in strict liability claims in
cases where the plaintiff's misuse was either foreseeable or unforesee-
able.191
Although most courts have adopted misuse in product liability ac-
tions in some form,'" courts are split in determining whether the defen-
dant must establish misuse as an affirmative defense, or if the plaintiffs
must demonstrate an absence of misuse in cases of strict liability and
negligence.9  Courts which view misuse as a form of proximate cause
place the burden on plaintiffs to show misuse did not occur,"9 and the
plaintiffs must show that the misuse was unforeseeable to the
defendant.'
The majority of jurisdictions, however, view misuse as a defen-
dant's affirmative defense.'" Generally, affirmative defenses require
proof of all elements based upon the preponderance of the evidence, and
the defendants are entitled to prevail even if the plaintiff proves all ele-
188. The Model Uniform Products Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,737 at § 112(c)(1); see 44
Fed. Reg. 62,737 (providing that when a manufacturer proves misuse as a cause of injury, damages
are reduced or apportioned to the extent that the misuse caused the harm).
189. Note, however, that the highest courts in Kansas and Texas have completely rejected the
misuse defense and supplanted it with comparative fault and contributory negligence. See Kennedy
v. City of Sawyer, 618 P.2d 788, 798 (Kan. 1980) (holding that comparative liability statutes sup-
plant the misuse defense); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 427 (Tex. 1984) (hold-
ing that contributory negligence must be used to replace the misuse defense); see also Kavanaugh v.
Southland Mower Co., 641 P.2d 258, 263 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (noting that if proximate or legal
cause of injury was misuse, and not product defect, there is no liability).
190. Zablotsky, supra note 167, at 199. "[S]trict liability focuses on the product rather than on
the manufacturer's conduct .... Toll, supra note 166, at 2307.
191. Toll, supra note 166, at 2308.
192. Ellsworth v. Sheme Lingerie, Inc., 495 A.2d 348, 353-54 (Md. 1985).
193. Id. at 354 (listing courts which have looked at causation and consequently categorized
misuse as an affirmative defense).
194. Usually the plaintiff will allege that the product was defective or unreasonably dangerous.
After this is established, the question becomes whether the harm "was within the risk created by the
defective producL" When the issue is stated as such, it becomes that of proximate cause, which is
normally part of the plaintiffs burden of proof. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A
Proposed Revision of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512,
1545-46 (1992).
195. Id. (stating that generally, in products liability cases, "the plaintiff is able to establish that
the product was defective, and the question then becomes whether the harm was within the risk
created by the defective product"); see, e.g., Ellsworth, 495 A.2d at 356 (holding that misuse is not
an affirmative defense because causation is an element of the plaintiffs case).
196. See Zablotsky, supra note 167, at 190. Of the 31 states that have addressed the issue of
burden of proof with any degree of specificity or certainty, 20 view misuse as a defense and place
the burden on the defendant. Id. at 201. The remaining II establish that disproving misuse is part of
the plaintiffs prima facie case and place the burden on the defendant. Id. at 201-03.
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ments of their case.'9" This concept becomes complicated, however, when
applied to the misuse doctrine. For example, a plaintiff who proves that a
defective product "caused" an injury is actually disproving that misuse
caused the injury.'" In this sense, misuse actually becomes "an inextrica-
ble part of the causation analysis in the plaintiff's case.""
B. Tenth Circuit Cases
1. Allen v. Minnstar'
a. Facts
In Allen v. Minnstar, the plaintiff fell overboard from a Wellcraft
Marine boat manufactured by Outboard Marine Corporation (OMR), and
the boat's unguarded propeller hit him.' He had been sitting in the bow
of the boat and fell when the boat's driver accelerated and made a sharp
turn in order to avoid an obstacle.' The plaintiff's left leg was so se-
verely lacerated that amputation was required," and he suffered abdomi-
nal injuries leading to a colostomy.' He then sued both Wellcraft and
OMR for a variety of products liability claims.' The suit alleged that
Wellcraft used a defective and unreasonably dangerous design,' and that
the boat should have been equipped with a propeller guard and proper
bow seating to prevent passenger ejection from the boat.' The court
ruled in favor of OMR on summary judgment.' and the plaintiff's re-
maining claims against Wellcraft proceeded to a jury trial.'
Wellcraft raised the misuse defense,2' asserting that the plaintiff was
sitting on the gunwale of the boat rather than the bow seat.2"' The jury
197. Toll, supra note 166, at 2308. For example, if the plaintiff in a contract case proves that a
contract existed, it was breached, and damages occurred, the defendant will still win if he or she
demonstrates that the statue of limitations expired three years before the suit was filed. Id.
198. Id. at 2309.
199. Id.
200. 97 F.3d 1365 (10th Cir. 1996).







208. See Allen v. Minnstar, Inc., 8 F.3d 1470, 1472-73 (10th Cir. 1993).
209. Minnstar, 97 F. 3d at 1367-68.
210. Id. at 1368. The trial transcript was not included in the record on appeal; therefore, the
appeals court could not determine whether Allen objected to the introduction of the misuse defense
during trial. The record did indicate that Allen filed written objections to the introduction of the
defense. Id. at 1368 n.l.
211. Id. at 1368.
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ruled in favor of Wellcraft, concluding that the boat was not unreasona-
bly dangerous."'
b. Decision
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit upheld the jury verdict for Wellcraft
and determined that foreseeability of product misuse was a jury
question.2 '3 The court, applying Utah case law,"" noted that state courts
had yet to determine if foreseeability of misuse prevented the defense."'
Noting that most states recognize the misuse defense and have generally
established that foreseeability of misuse is a jury question, the Tenth
Circuit upheld the decision."6 The Tenth Circuit also noted that evidence
of the plaintiff sitting on the gunwale rather than the seat of the boat was
relevant as to whether the design of the boat's seating was the proximate
cause of the injuries, regardless of the misuse defense."' Therefore, the
court concluded, even had misuse not been used in the jury instructions,
the issue was still highly relevant because it was necessary to establish
the essential elements of the strict liability claim.'
2. Staley v. BridgestonelFirestone Inc."9
a. Facts
In Staley v. BridgestonelFirestone Inc., an employee died after a
multipiece tire and rim assembly explosively separated while he was
attempting to install a new tire on a road grader."' The decedent's estate
brought suit against Firestone, claiming that it was foreseeable that such
an explosion would occur,' and that the product was defective, unrea-
sonably dangerous, and negligently designed.' Firestone's primary de-
212. Id. at 1367-68.
213. Id. at 1369.
214. Id. at 1368-69. The court acknowledged that the Utah Supreme Court recognized misuse
as an affirmative defense in strict products liability. Id. at 1368 (citing Ernest W. Hahn v. Armco
Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah 1979)). Utah also applies comparative fault principles to the
misuse defense. See Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301, 1303 (Utah 1981) (noting that
the jury should be asked to consider "the relative burden each [party] should bear for the injury they
have caused").
215. Minnstar, 97 F.3d at 1368.
216. Id. at 1368-69 (citing several cases holding that the determination of forseeability is a
question for the jury).
217. Id. at 1369.
218. Id.
219. 106 F.3d 1504 (10th Cir. 1997).
220. Staley, 106 F.3d at 1507.
221. id.
222. Id. at 1508.
223. Id. The plaintiff produced evidence showing that "if the components of the rim were
assembled without being fully engaged, they might separate following the addition of inflation
pressure." Id.
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fense against Staley's estate was misuse," ' alleging that the decedent
failed to follow the suggested safety procedures.2" Firestone also claimed
that the decedent should have used the tire and rim restraint, not a ham-
mer upon an inflated tire, and that the decedent mounted the tire contrary
to his safety training.'
As support, Firestone introduced evidence showing that the dece-
dent had signed a training record acknowledging his familiarity and prior
training with such rims.' In addition, Firestone introduced significant
evidence demonstrating the decedent's familiarity with proper safety
procedures." Finally, the defense brought forth statistics showing that
the rim components in question had been involved in over ten million
servicings with only eight recorded accidents.2' The plaintiffs, however,
argued that because Firestone could have reasonably foreseen the possi-
bility of the decedent's conduct, Firestone could not assert the misuse
defense.' The district court granted Firestone summary judgment on the
failure-to-warn claim,"I and the jury found for Firestone on the remain-
ing claims. 2
b. Decision
Upon reviewing the plaintiff's appeal, the Tenth Circuit recognized
the three elements of misuse applicable under Colorado law:" (1)
whether the use was for an unintended manner or for an unintended pur-
pose; (2) whether the use was reasonably foreseeable to the manufac-
turer; and (3) whether the misuse caused the injury.' The plaintiffs as-
serted the misuse defense was inapplicable, because a similar accident
had occurred in the past, making the possibility of the misuse foresee-






229. Id. at 1510.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 1508. Relying on Cruz v. Texaco, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 777 (S.D. Ill. 1984), the district
court held that the defendant was not strictly liable for failure to warn and had no duty to warn. Cruz
held that a manufacturer of a winch truck would not be liable for the death of an employee because
the decedent's employer was aware of the danger of the potential danger of driving at high speed
with objects in tow and could have warned the employee. Staley, 106 F.3d at 1509.
232. Id. at 1508.
233. Colorado has adopted the Restatement's approach. Id. at 1510.
234. Id. (citing Uptain v. Huntington Lab, Inc., 723 P.2d 1322, 1325-26 (Colo. 1986)).
235. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that Firestone was aware of other injuries and deaths that resulted
from conduct similar to Staley's conduct before his death. They cited a 1973 incident in which a lock
ring was not properly seated, injured a manager who hit it with a hammer and relied upon Colorado
Supreme Court decisions that found it was erroneous not to allow a misuse instruction after the
plaintiffs produced evidence of prior reported incidents involving the same type of conduct. Id.
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Firestone because of the low number of accidents occurring from the
number of servicings.' Furthermore, the court relied upon the testimony
of two defense experts that the decedent's actions were unforeseeable.'
Although the plaintiffs argued that one portion of the misuse jury
instruction did not allow the jury to consider comparative fault and ap-
portion the fault accordingly," the court rejected this argument. The
court determined that all elements of misuse were found, and compara-
tive fault principles need only be applied if the jury determines one of the
elements was not proven.2
3. Daniel v. Ben E. Keith Co.2'
a. Facts
In Daniel v. Ben E. Keith Company, the Tenth Circuit addressed the
principles of user foreseeability. The plaintiff alleged that she sustained
injuries"4 while working in a restaurant preparing tortillas in a deep fat
fryer.'2 After another employee accidentally poured bleach into the
fryer, 3 the plaintiff suffered from exposure to the chlorine gas2" and
consequently was unable to work full time.' She filed a failure-to-warn
claim against the manufacturer of the bleach, Ben E. Keith Company
(Keith), alleging that the bleach was defective because its label did not
adequately warn of such risks.24 The defendant claimed that the other
(citing Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175, 187-89 (Colo. 1992), and Schmutz v. Bolles, 800
P.2d 1307, 1316 (Colo. 1990)).
236. id. In this case, the plaintiffs presented only one incident that involved hammering on this
type of product. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. The plaintiffs noted the Colorado pattern jury instruction which included the following:
If you find that all of these three propositions have been proved, then your verdict must
be for the manufacturer. (On the other hand, if you find that any of these three pro-
postions has not been proved, you may still consider whether plaintiff's use of the prod-
uct constitutes comparative fault, as that term is defined in these instructions).
Id. at 1510-11. The jury instruction submitted, however, included the following:
A manufacturer of a product is not legally responsible for injuries or damages caused by
a product if:
The product was used in a manner other than that which was intended;
That use could not reasonably have been expected by the manufacturer; and




240. 97 F.3d 1329 (10th Cir. 1996).
241. Daniel, 97 F.3d at 1331. The plaintiff claimed to suffer from Reactive Airway Dysfunction
Syndrome (RADS). Id.
242. Daniel, 97 F.3d at 133 1.
243. Id. at 1332.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1331-32.
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employee's negligent actions were the sole cause of the plaintiffs inju-
ries. " The jury agreed and returned a verdict for the defendant.2"
b. Decision
Upon review, the Tenth Circuit determined that the plaintiff must
show that he would have read and heeded warnings on the label.2" The
court found that no such presumption existed in this case because the co-
worker testified that he was in a hurry at the time of the accident.' While
acknowledging that manufacturers must anticipate all foreseeable uses of
the product,' the court found this particular misuse to be unforeseeable,
creating no duty to warn. 2
C. Other Circuits
The Eighth Circuit also considered foreseeability as an element of
misuse in Chronister v. Bryco Arms."3 The plaintiff brought a products
liability action subsequent to a gun accident, claiming that the gun was
defectively designed.' In addition, the plaintiff argued that the manu-
facturer failed to warn of the possibility of the gun misfiring.' The
manufacturer argued that, despite a recommendation on the packaging,
the plaintiff misused the product by failing to wear ear protection.' After
a trial, the jury found for the plaintiff on both strict liability and negli-
gence claims." '
On appeal, the defendant argued that it was not reasonably foresee-
able that a purchaser would use its handguns without wearing ear protec-
tion.' Additionally, the defendant asserted that use of a product that
contradicted the product's warnings could not be considered a "reasona-
bly anticipated" use.' The court disagreed, noting that basic products




250. Id. at 1333.
251. Id. at 1334 (quoting Smith v. United States Gypsum Co., 612 P.2d 251, 254 (Okla. 1980)).
252. Id.
253. 125 F. 3d 624 (8th Cir. 1997).
254. Chronister, 125 F.3d at 625.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. The jury apportioned five percent of the fault to Chronister on the strict liability claims
and twenty-five percent on the negligence claim. Id.
258. Id. at 626-27.
259. Id. at 627.
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a defective product that has foreseeably been misused,' ° and the judg-
ment was affirmed. 6'
D. Analysis
The Tenth and Eighth Circuits agreed that the definition of misuse
should involve some aspect of foreseeability."2 The Tenth Circuit, how-
ever, did not clarify whether the misuse defense should be an affirmative
defense, or part of the plaintiff's claim that must be disproved.'
The Tenth Circuit failed to clarify issues raised in Allen v. Minnstar.
Initially, the court characterized misuse as if it were an affirmative de-
fense and considered evidence introduced by the defendant to disprove
liability. ' Second, the court suggested that the defendant need not raise
the defense at all because causation was "highly relevant" to establishing
essential elements of the strict liability claim.' This analysis did not
clarify the proper scope and application of the doctrine of misuse in
products liability law.
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit made significant contributions to products liabil-
ity law during the survey period. A clear interpretation of Medtronic and
the preemption doctrine will undoubtedly help consumers to assert state
tort law claims against manufacturers of defective products. Similarly,
Yoder provides courts and practitioners with guidance in applying the
apparent manufacturer doctrine. The misuse defense, however, remains
unclear in the wake of inconsistent interpretations, and courts will likely
continue to struggle with this lack of clarity.
Lana Steven
260. Id.
261. Id. (finding that use of the gun without hearing protection was foreseeable, and thus the
misuse defense could not be applied).
262. See Chronister, 125 F.3d at 627; Staley v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 106 F.3d 1504,
1510 (10th Cir. 1997); Allen v. Minnstar, Inc., 97 F.3d 1365, 1368 (10th Cir. 1996).
263. See Toll, supra note 166, at 2307 (1991).
264. Minnstar, 97 F.3d at 1368.
265. Id.
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